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Abstract: The causal theory of perception (CTP) has come under a great deal of critical scrutiny from 
philosophers of mind interested in the nature of perception. M. H. Newman’s set-theoretic objection 
to Russell’s structuralist version of the CTP, in his 1928 paper “Mr Russell’s Causal Theory of 
Perception” has not, to my knowledge, figured in these discussions. In this paper I aim to show that 
it should: Newman’s objection can be generalized to yield a particularly powerful and incisive 
challenge to all versions of the CTP. In effect it says that if the CTP is true, at least one of the 
following claims must be false. (1) Our perception-based judgements are made true or false by the 
state of mind independent objects. (2) The concepts we use in such judgments refer to the intrinsic, 
mind-independent properties of such objects. (3) Experience provides us with knowledge of these 
properties. The paper sets out the structure of the problem as Newman saw it, extends it to current 
debates in theory of perception and considers various responses to it. The response I argue for 
involves jettisoning the CTP in favour of a relational account of perceptual experience, in a way that 
allows us to hold onto all three  claims. 
Keywords: Russell, Newman, causal theory of perception, epistemic structural realism, relational 





THE CAUSAL THEORY OF PERCEPTION (CTP)  has,  over  the  past  three  decades, 
come under a great deal of critical scrutiny from philosophers of mind interested    
in the nature of perception. M. H. Newman’s set-theoretic objection to Russell’s 
structuralist version of the CTP,  in his 1928 paper “Mr Russell’s Causal Theory      
of Perception”, has not, to my knowledge, figured much if at all in these discus- 
sions. The major aim of what follows just is to show that it should. Newman’s 
objection can be generalized beyond its official structuralist target to yield a 
particularly powerful and incisive challenge to all versions of the CTP. A second 
aim, as the title of the paper suggests, is  to  show  how  and  why  relational  
accounts of perceptual experience provide the most promising response to the 
challenge. 
As the framework in which Newman’s argument has been discussed in philoso- 
phy of science is somewhat removed from the way issues are formulated in debates 
about the nature of perception in the philosophy of mind, before setting it out in its 
own terms, it may help to have the background problem stated in more familiar 
perception-theoretic  terms. 
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Suppose that on the basis of a visual experience you judge: “There is a rectan- 
gular and brown table in front of me”. Normally, we would make the following 
assumptions  about  such judgements. 
1) They are made true or false by  the state of the mind-independent object      
you see. 
2) The concepts you use in such judgments, in this case “rectangular” and 
“brown”, for example, refer to intrinsic mind independent properties rather 
than to any structural equivalents, and it is the instantiation of such properties 
by the object you perceive that will render your judgment true or false. 
3) Your perception provides you with knowledge of these instantiated  
properties. 
As I will be returning to these claims throughout the paper, I will label genera-  
lized versions of them “Realism”, “Reference” and “Experiential Knowledge” 
respectively. 
In these terms, according to Newman, if Russell’s version of the CTP is true we 
must give up reference. Experiential Knowledge could, in principle, secure Refer- 
ence, but, on Russell’s own CTP assumptions, using experiential knowledge to 
secure reference would result in giving up Realism. That, in general very crude 
form, is the dilemma Newman presents us with, and to which he offers no solution. 
In sections 2 to 5, I set out Newman’s argument for the dilemma, in its own terms. 
In section 6, I consider responses derived from David Lewis, which are intended to 
secure reference and realism without experiential knowledge. I argue that though 
coherent they give us much less than we think we have; and the remainder of the 
paper examines what we need to have in place to secure all three claims, reference, 
realism and experiential knowledge. In section 7, I formulate a generalized version 
of Newman’s challenge, directed at current, non-structuralist versions of the CTP, 
which both highlights the role experiential knowledge in fact plays in our thinking, 
and claims that no version of the CTP can accommodate this role. In section 8, I 
sketch the basic structure of an acquaintance-based account of experiential 
knowledge, which jettisons the CTP. The remaining two sections con- 
sider the compatibility of this account with realism. 
Before beginning, by way of a final orienting comment, it may help to note two 
analogies with recent arguments in the philosophy of mind, though I will not have 
the space to pursue them. First, with respect to theories of perception, as I will 
present it, the problem that frames Newman’s argument against Russell, as far as  
the play-off between realism and experiential knowledge is concerned, is antici- 
pated, in some key respects, by the Berkeley of John Campbell’s “Berkeley’s 
Puzzle”, and my appeal to acquaintance in response to Newman’s way of formu- 
lating the issues is structurally related to Campbell’s appeal to it. (Campbell, 2002, 
2011). Closely related echoes are to be found in Bill Brewer’s “inconsistent triad” 
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as formulated in his “Perception and Its Objects” (Brewer, 2007, 2011). Second,  
and more generally, the generalized version of the argument should also resonate 
with a variety of reference and meaning determinacy challenges to be found in the 
literature. To anticipate, very crudely, the relational response I will sketch says that 
acquaintance with the properties instantiated by the external objects of our com- 
monsense realism comes to the (non-sceptical) rescue.1 
 
 
2. The Claims 
 
In this section I introduce the claims that structure Newman’s argument, and make 
some preliminary, stage-setting comments about them. They can be summarized as 
follows. 
1) If the CTP  is  true,  our  perception-based  knowledge  of  the  external  
world is purely structural, as Russell argues in The Analysis of Matter. 
(Structuralism.) 
2) Purely structural claims about the external world are trivially true, given basic 
theorems in set theory, and hence devoid of empirical content. (Triviality.) 
3) To achieve empirical content they need to be anchored to particular proper- 
ties and relations in the external world. (Anchoring.) 
4) Such anchoring is possible only if we are acquainted with the referents of the 
terms we use to refer to them. (Acquaintance.) 
5) Acquaintance is only possible with the properties of mental items such as 
sensations.  (Sensation.) 
6) If (5) is true, we must abandon realism about the external world and adopt 
some form of phenomenal idealism. (Idealism.) 
7) The problem with idealism, in particular of the phenomenalist and solipsist 
kind is that “it is doubtful whether anyone [is] really able to believe either of 
them. The belief in other people and the external world are just as much data, 
part of our mental makeup, as are sensations” (Newman, 1928, p. 138). 
Clearly, each of the claims is highly debateable, and each deserves much more 
attention than I will be able to give it here. A few clarificatory remarks about some 
of the claims will help introduce the issues I will be concerned with in subsequent 
sections. 
 
1 As I will develop it, the relational response appeals specifically to a non-causal relation of Russellian 
acquaintance with objects, in a way that is perhaps closest to Campbell (2009). However, most theories 
which treat objects as constituents, rather than causes, of experience, or endorse naïve realism, in Mike 
Martin’s sense, will be able to avail themselves of many of the central claims I will make on behalf of the 
relational theory as I develop it. See, e.g., Martin (2006) and Brewer (2011). 
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Newman’s own original contribution to debates about the viability of the kind of 
indirect realism and the CTP that Russell endorses in The Analysis of Matter 
(Russell, 1927) lies in his set-theoretic argument for triviality,  and it is this that    
has attracted most attention in the philosophy of science. In section 3, I set out 
Newman’s argument for triviality. For our purposes, I will assume that once spelled 
out the argument should be accepted, though it clearly raises very interesting and 
difficult issues. 
The problems the paper will focus on are those raised by claims (3)–(5). 
Anchoring is accepted by almost everyone who wants to do justice to realism and 
reference and is convinced by  triviality.2 The question for philosophers of science   
is whether it can be met while hanging onto structuralism (as many are inclined to 
do, given the highly abstract content of current physics). In section 5, I set out what  
I think are the two most convincing positive answers, both derived from Lewis’ 
response to a related problem he dubs “Putnam’s paradox”. The defining feature of 
these responses, relative to the claims that structure Newman’s argument, is that 
they meet anchoring without appeal to acquaintance. Acquaintance, as understood 
by Newman and Russell, delivers Experiential Knowledge, so they deliver Realism 
and reference without appeal to Experiential Knowledge. (Doing so immediately 
disposes of the need to take seriously claims (5)–(7).) 
If the Lewisian moves succeed, as I will suggest they may well do (considered 
from a purely metaphysically perspective), the unmodified Acquaintance claim, 
which says that only acquaintance can provide the kind of anchoring required for 
meeting Anchoring must be false. But to concede this is not the same as conceding 
that acquaintance does not in fact provide the kind of anchoring to the external 
world that we should appeal to in response to Triviality. To argue that it does is to 
hang onto Acquaintance and to reject Sensation, with the aim of securing Experi- 
ential Knowledge. This is what I call, in the title, the “relational response” to 
Newman’s challenge. Arguments for this position will be presented as a response   
to a generalized version of Newman’s challenge. 
As to structuralism: while widely accepted in the philosophy of science, current 
perception-theoretic discussions of the CTP are wholly independent of any such 
commitment. Initially, in setting out Newman’s argument, I will simply lay out 
Russell’s claims in this connection, without questioning the link between the CTP 
and structuralism. In section 6, I formulate a version of Newman’s argument  
against the CTP, which retains the substance of his challenge, but does not presup- 
pose a structuralist account of the contents of knowledge-expressing judgments 
about the external  world. 
2 “Ontic structural realists” have no need for it. See, e.g., Ladyman (2013). The realists I am concerned 
with throughout, in contrast, all hold that “nature carved at its joints” consists of entities with categorical 
or intrinsic properties. Ontic structuralism raises interesting questions in its own right, which do not 
directly affect the arguments I will be concerned  with. 
© 2013 Stiftelsen Theoria  
8 NAOMI EILAN 
 
Finally, Newman’s elaboration of (7) is brief. Although he thinks idealism is 
unbelievable, his commitment, sometimes implicit, to the preceding claims leaves 
this as a permanent threat that he cannot dismiss. The challenge he leaves  us with  
is to find some way of avoiding it by modifying or rejecting any of the preceding 
claims. In what follows, I will not attempt to argue for (7), but will exploit it and 
elaborate it (with respect to the external world) when fleshing out what realism 
commits  us to. 
 
 
3. Newman’s Argument  for Triviality 
 
A major aim of Russell’s The Analysis of Matter is (a) to show that scientific 
theories deliver knowledge of a mind-independent external world, in contrast to 
earlier claims of his that the external world is a logical construction out of sense 
data; but (b) to argue that this knowledge is purely structural. The central idea is 
this. We have direct and immediate acquaintance only with sensations (or, “per- 
cepts”, as he now calls them), where this gives us knowledge of their intrinsic 
character. It is, however, reasonable to assume the truth of a causal theory of 
perception, where this, in turn, gives us the right to assume the existence of a 
structural isomorphism between the structure of our sensational fields and the 
structure of the external world. But this is as good as it gets. As he puts it: “Thus, 
from the structure of our perceptions we can infer a great deal as to the structure of 
the physical world, but not as to its intrinsic character” (Russell, 1927, p. 400). 
Consequently: “The only legitimate attitude about the physical world seems to be 
one of complete agnosticism about all but its mathematical properties” (Russell, 
1927, p. 270). This is the position that in current debates is labelled “epistemic 
structural realism”. 
Newman’s summary of the basic claim Russell is making captures perfectly its 
central thrust. 
Briefly: of the external world we know its structure and nothing more. We know about things that are 
not percepts, the kind of thing a blind man could be told about a picture, as opposed to the additional 
knowledge of intrinsic quality that we have of percepts. (Newman, 1928, p. 142) 
Newman begins his discussion of the position sympathetically, noting its fit with 
current theorizing in physics, and, in particular, its initial attractiveness relative to 
earlier versions of indirect realism, an attractiveness stemming from the precision  
of Russell’s notion of “sameness of structure”. Sameness of structure, on the 
Russellian approach, is explained by Newman as follows. 
Let a set A of objects be given, and relation R which holds between certain subsets of A. Let B be 
a second set of objects, also provided with a relation S which holds between certain subsets of its 
members. The two systems are said to have the same structure if a (1,1) correlation can be set up 
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between the members of A and those of B such that if two members of A have the relation R their 
correlates have the relation S, and vice  versa. 
Newman illustrates this with an example in which A is a random collection of 
people and the relation among them is one of acquaintance. This system will have 
the same structure as a map made by joining dots on a line, where each dot 
corresponds to a person, and the lines to the relations of acquaintance. Where there 
is a line, there is acquaintance, and vice versa. It is in this sense that the two systems 
have the same structure. The importance of the example is that it shows that on this 
definition of sameness of structure, “it is not at all necessary for the objects 
composing A and B, nor the relations R and S to be qualitatively similar. In fact to 
discuss the structure of the system A it is only necessary to know the incidence of  
R; its intrinsic qualities are quite irrelevant” (Newman, 1928, p. 142). 
However, having given full credit to the attractiveness of this position, Newman 
immediately moves in for the kill, in two steps. The first step is to note that given 
this definition of sameness of structure, to say that a portion of the external world 
has the same structure as a given sensory field, for example, is to say no more than 
that the external world has a given number of objects (the same as that presented in 
the sensory field), and that there is a relation that holds between these objects that 
has a structure W. For example, returning to the example of acquaintance, consider 
the case of a society consisting of three people and the two-place relation of 
acquaintance. Suppose that in this society A is acquainted with B and B with C but 
A and C are not acquainted. To say that another system has the same structure is to 
say that it consists of three objects, and that there exists a two-place relation among 
them which generates that same structure. 
Newman’s second step leads immediately to Triviality. Such claims about struc- 
ture are trivially true, he says, given basic theorems of set theory. 
Any collection of things can be organised so as to have the structure W (where W is an arbitrary 
structure), provided there are the right number of them. Hence the doctrine that only structure is 
known involves the doctrine that nothing can be known that is not logically deducible from the mere 
fact of existence, except (“theoretically”) the number of constituting objects. (Newman, 1928,       
p. 144) 
What he means is this. First, being told that a system has a domain that consists of 
three objects, a, b, and c and that it instantiates a relation R, where, say, R = {(a, b), 
(b, c)} tells us no more than that the system consists of three objects because 
elementary set theory shows that any three objects will instantiate a vast number of 
such relations.3 So, other than the assertion of cardinality, the instantiation claim is 
deducible from set theory, and is in this sense trivial. But it is also far more specific 
than is warranted, if uniqueness is being suggested, insofar as R is just one of the 
 
3   For a development of this claim, and the proof, see Ainsworth (2009, p. 8). 
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vast number of non-empty relations they instantiate. And this, in essence, is what 
the triviality claim amounts to. To say we have only structural knowledge of the 
external world is tantamount to saying we have no empirical knowledge of it (other 
than that contained in the assertion of cardinality). 
Most recent discussions of Newman, following Demopoulos  and Friedman’s 
lead in their agenda-setting paper (Demopoulos and  Friedman,  1985),  take  as  
their point of departure the Ramsey-sentence approach to the structural knowledge 
claim, which was first formulated as such by Grove Maxwell, where it is this  
version that usually gets dubbed “epistemic structural realism”. On this approach, 
we can capture the content of a complete theory of the world and the knowledge it 
provides us with by giving its Ramsey sentence, that is, by replacing all theoretical 
terms with variables, and then binding the variables with the appropriate quantifi- 
ers. We can treat such sentences as delivering the kind of purely structural claim 
about the world that Russell had in mind, though neither he nor Newman adopted 
this second-order approach. Newman’s complaint, reformulated for this version of 
structural realism, remains, in essence, the same. The Ramsey sentence is bound to 




4. The Problem 
 
Triviality has been extensively discussed and debated, mainly within the philosophy 
of science.4 I know of no convincing rejection of it, as formulated here. This will 
seem very quick, and is. For our purposes though, it will suffice, for the question I 
want to consider is this. Suppose, with many, that Triviality is right. What follows 
from it? 
There are two important assumptions Newman makes in formulating what he  
took to be available responses to Triviality, both listed earlier. 
First, he assumes that only appeal to acquaintance with intrinsic properties can 
overcome Triviality (Acquaintance). Second, he assumes (albeit implicitly) that 
acquaintance is only possible with sensations and their properties (sensation).  
Given both claims, as he saw it, the only way to address Triviality is to relinquish 
precisely the kind of realism Russell was trying to secure. That is the challenge he 
sets us. To put it in the terms I used in the introduction: Newman thinks that 
Reference requires Experiential Knowledge (secured by acquaintance), and that we 
can only have  that if we  give  up Realism. 
 
 
4 For an excellent, comprehensive review of these debates, though not under that heading, see Ainsworth 
(2009). 
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Suppose we want to uphold realism. What are our options? A claim almost 
universally accepted in response to this question is that there must be some way of 
anchoring the structural propositions to relations and/or intrinsic properties in the 
external world if propositions purporting to be about it are to have empirical  
content. This is what I called Anchoring. In the next section I set out two versions  
of it that are intended to secure realism while hanging onto Russell’s basic 
epistemic  structuralism. 
 
5. Anchoring  without Acquaintance 
 
Developments in the literature of Anchoring are many, as are the dimensions along 
which they might be classified. From the perspective of the philosophy of science, 
perhaps the most important question is whether epistemic structural realism can be 
salvaged, if we accept Triviality. The two positive responses I want to have  before  
us under this heading are both discussed by David Lewis in his “Putnam’s paradox” 
(Lewis, 1984), in which he notes the similarity between Putnam’s model theoretic 
argument against realism and Newman’s argument. For our purposes, we can 
consider Lewis’ responses to Putnam’s argument as responses to Newman’s. 
The first type of response appeals to causation. One version says that it is a 
constraint on any theory of reference that the terms used are causally linked to the 
objects that cause their use. This is not part of the content of the general theory of 
the world, but a constraint on there being reference in play in the first place. A 
similar claim might be made about perception. For it to be true that perception is 
occurring there must be a causal link between the perceptual state and an object 
perceived. The reference to the causal link is not part of the content of the 
perception-based statement or thought, unlike the way it is conceived of in many 
classical causal theories perception, but, rather, a constraint on there being a 
perception in play in the first place. If something like this is right, then we can say 
that despite our purely structural knowledge, we are linked to a particular set of 
objects and particular properties, via our causal link, in perception, with members  
of the set. Someone who adopts the CTP and wants to salvage the pure structure 
claim will likely opt for this kind of account of anchoring. 
The second type of response discussed by Lewis, originally proposed (though not 
endorsed) by G. H. Merrill (Merrill, 1980), is to invoke the idea that among all the 
possible things and classes that might make structural statements true, there are 
“elite” classes and things, carved at nature’s joints, and only these are genuine or 
eligible candidates for reference. The world isn’t just a collection of objects instan- 
tiating any number of possible relations. Rather, there are natural groupings of 
objects, by natural relations, and our quantifiers range over these natural objects, 
properties and relations. It is about these that we possess purely structural 
knowledge. 
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This is the position endorsed by Lewis. As he puts it, it turns out that “realism 
needs realism” (Lewis, 1984, p. 228). By this he means that “the realism that 
recognizes a nontrivial enterprise of discovering truth about the world needs the 
traditional realism that recognizes objective sameness and difference, joints in the 
world, discriminatory classifications not of our own making” (Lewis, 1984, p. 228). 
If realism makes sense at all, traditional realism must makes sense. And if the latter 
makes sense, according to an adherent of this Lewisian approach, Newman’s 
problem is solved. 
From the perspective of the philosophy of science, the most important feature of 
this kind of response is one that it shares with the kind of causal response mentioned 
earlier, namely the idea we can do justice to Realism and Reference without giving 
up the claim that the content of our knowledge of the world is purely structural. To say 
this is to reject acquaintance, which says that the only way to make structural claims 
latch onto particular objects, relations and properties, in the required way, is to treat 
the terms used in these claims as mediated by acquaintance with their referents. 
Within the philosophy of science we find a series of objections to this and related 
proposals many of which, in effect, take the form of Putnam’s “just more theory” 
complaint. This objection presses the question of how “naturalness” and “causa- 
tion” are to be understood. Either both “natural” and “causal” are replaced by 
purely structural definitions, in which case they are subject to the many possible 
realizations complaint. Or they are treated as brute primitives in the theory, inex- 
plicable by us, that are somehow meant to secure reference only to natural prop- 
erties, and this seems, at best, ad hoc. 
An immediate response on Lewis’ behalf would be that to think this dilemma 
applies to his proposal is simply to miss the force of the distinction between a 
constraint on a theory and the content of the theory. To endorse the “just more 
theory” complaint, for the above reasons, is to assume that “naturalness” and 
“causation” occur in the content of the theory. The point of excluding them from the 
content and treating them as a constraint is that such worries fail to get a grip. 
But what, exactly, is the source of the worries that Lewis is responding to in this 
way? I think the key issue here is this. Newman, and, indeed, Russell, assume that 
propositional knowledge requires understanding, on the part of the subject express- 
ing such knowledge, of the concepts that go into grasping the proposition. And 
relative to that assumption, the distinction between external constraints and the 
contents of a theory will be of little interest. For questions of intelligibility arise, it 
might be said, whether “we” refers to us as everyday users, scientists, or philoso- 
phers giving an account of how thought latches onto the world. The problem is 
simply  pushed back. 
Put in this way, Lewis’ response would be that the mistake he is interested in is, 
precisely, that of subjecting metaphysics to questions of understanding, to questions 
about how we, as users and/or philosophers understand the terms we use. (This is 
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certainly the mistake he thinks Putnam makes.) If we do our metaphysics via a 
theory of understanding we are bound to end up with a rejection of realism. 
Questions about understanding are interesting, perhaps, in their own right, but the 
question at issue is a distinct one: can purely structural propositions secure refer- 
ence to a wholly mind independent reality? The appeal to naturalness, or, for that 
matter, causation is intended as an explanation of how this is possible, whatever we 
go on to say about intelligibility and the like. 
My own view is that this kind of response to Newman’s Triviality is legitimate,  
as far as it goes, in that it contains no hidden incoherence or infinite regress and so 
forth. To put it in the terms of the trio of claims we set out with—Realism, 
Reference and Experiential Knowledge—Lewis’ argument can work, formally, to 
secure the first two without any appeal to the third. But my question, from now on, 
will not depend on this view. For, even if it is a coherent response to the challenge, 
there is a further question as to whether it is the right one. 
A fundamental reason for thinking that the Lewisian move is, at the very least,  
too quick is this. It is one thing to say that metaphysics should not be controlled or 
determined by questions of what we  find intelligible. It is another thing to say  that  
a philosophical vindication of realism should completely bypass any appeal to the 
way we in fact understand the concepts we use  in  perception-based  judgments 
about what we take to be a mind-independent world. This is what Lewis is propos- 
ing. On the face of it, this is a line we should follow only in extremis, only if are 
convinced that what we think is going on when we make experience-based judg- 
ments about the world is wrong. In particular, in our case, only if we agree with 
Russell and Lewis, and of course all other scientific realists, on the one hand, and 
idealists on the other, that we must choose between experiential knowledge and 
realism. If this is not the case, a vindication of realism should, at the same time, be  
a vindication of our claims to knowledge on the basis of experience of the intrinsic 
properties of objects in the mind independent world. 
In the next section I propose a simplified version of Newman’s challenge, 
directed at all versions of the CTP, which highlights the role we intuitively give 
experiential knowledge. I then come back to the problem of the relation between 
experiential  knowledge  and realism. 
 
 
6. Newman’s  Challenge Generalized 
 
To get going, it will help to return to the way the general problem we are concerned 
with was formulated in the introduction. So, suppose, again, that you see an object 
and on that basis judge: “There is a rectangular and brown table in front of me”. As 
noted in the introduction, normally we would make the  following assumptions 
about  such judgments. 
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1) They are made true or false by the state of the mind-independent object you 
see (Realism.) 
2) The concepts you use in such judgments, in this case “rectangular” and 
“brown”, for example, refer to particular mind independent properties rather 
than to structural equivalents, and it is the instantiation of such properties that 
will render your judgment true or false. (Reference.) 
3) Your perception provides you with knowledge of these instantiated proper- 
ties.  (Experiential Knowledge.) 
Suppose now  that a sceptic asks you: how  do you know  that the property you  
are perceiving is one intrinsic or categorical property, rather than one of limitless 
structurally equivalent properties?5 By a “structurally equivalent property” the 
sceptic means a property that satisfies the same structural description. The most 
natural and immediate answer is that you know because you are presented through 
perception with an instance of the intrinsic property of rectangularity, say, rather 
than with structural equivalents. It, rather than a structural equivalent, is phenom- 
enally present to you. From now on, it will be integral to Experiential Knowledge,  
as I will be treating it, that its assertion delivers this kind of appeal to phenomenal 
presence in responding to the sceptic. It is a claim to knowledge, from within the 
perspective of consciousness, of the categorical properties perceived. (I return soon 
to possible objections to this stipulation.) 
Finally, suppose you adopt the key claim made by current versions of the CTP. In 
such accounts, to say that S consciously perceives O is to say, at the very least, that  
S is in an experiential state that is caused by O. To focus on the case of vision, the 
key claim here is that the visual experience and the object are causally related 
“separate existences”, where this is understood as entailing that the phenomenal 
character of any particular experience can be explained without essential appeal to 
the object that in fact causes the occurrence of the experience.6 This independence  
of phenomenal character from the object perceived, typically argued for by  appeal  
to illusions and hallucinations, is the key ingredient we need to focus on. 
With all of this in place, the new version of Newman’s challenge can be formu- 
lated as follows. So long as you hold onto the CTP, you cannot appeal to experi- 
ential knowledge to answer the sceptic (assuming Realism and Reference). It is 
 
 
5 There has been much debate about, and refinement of, the notion of an “intrinsic” property. I am using 
the term very loosely, to mean only a non-structural property, and, in this context, will use “intrinsic” and 
“categorical” interchangeably. 
6 Of course there are other ways in which we might appeal to causation and causal explanation when 
accounting for what perception is, that do not commit to the separate existence claim, to which I return at 
the end of the paper. From now on, though, when I speak of the CTP, I will have this stipulative definition 
in mind. The locus classicus of the theory is Grice (1989). For important early critiques of the theory see 
Snowdon (1980–81) and Snowdon (1990). 
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generalized relative to Newman’s version in that it does not link the CTP to 
Russell’s structural account of our knowledge of the external world. 
The reasoning behind this version of the challenge is simple. On all versions of 
the CTP, how things seem to the subject, on its own, cannot suffice to secure 
knowledge that rules out the claim that one’s experience is caused by  properties  
that are merely structurally equivalent to the intrinsic properties one would appeal  
to in describing phenomenal presence. For it is an article of faith in all such theories 
that how things seem to you from within the perspective of your experience is 
neutral about what in fact causes the experience. This is a straightforward extension 
and application of claims and arguments made for such independence in the case of 
illusions and hallucinations. Given this commitment, how things seem to the  
subject when she describes her experience as one in which she is presented with an 
instance of rectangularity cannot suffice to rule out the claim that the experience is 
in fact caused by an external structural equivalent of rectangularity. For all one’s 
experiences tell one, from within the perspective of how things seem to one, it could 
be any one of structurally identical properties that is causing the experience—this   
is not something experience “as it presents itself to us” can rule out. If that is right, 
one cannot appeal to phenomenal presence to secure reference, unless one is 
prepared to give up realism, which we are here assuming is not up for grabs. 
That is the challenge. Three of many possible responses are worth mentioning 
here. 
 
1) The first agrees with the terms in which the challenge is formulated and sees  
it as providing yet another argument in favour of a Lewisian bypassing of any 
appeal to epistemological considerations in answering Newman’s original 
challenge. For what it shows, the claim will be, is that if we want to secure 
reference and realism we must appeal to the kinds of extra-epistemological 
considerations  Lewis  appeals to. 
2) The second response will object to the stipulative definition I gave of experi- 
ential knowledge. It is true, it says, that we have experiential knowledge when 
we make judgements on the basis of experience, but wrong to define it in the 
way sketched above, where phenomenal presence on its own suffices to 
silence the sceptic. Experiential Knowledge, as explained above, should be 
replaced by  Experiential Knowledge*. The latter claim says that the kind      
of knowledge of perceived properties that we express when we make 
perception-based judgments should be given a bi-partite account on which 
phenomenology alone does not secure for the subject knowledge of which 
property she is perceiving. Such knowledge also depends on the existence of 
an external causal connection between one’s experience and the property 
causing  the  experience.  Ultimately  one’s  knowledge  of  which   parti- 
cular property one is perceiving depends on the causal component in such 
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knowledge. In answering the sceptic, it is to this kind of causal link we should 
appeal. So, contra the sceptic, we can have both the CTP and experiential 
knowledge, when the latter is properly explained. 
3) The final response accepts the terms in which the sceptical challenge has  
been formulated, and the sceptic’s argument, but concludes that rather than 
reject experiential knowledge and its capacity to secure reference we should 
reject the CTP. This would be the response of someone who adopts a rela- 
tional account of perceptual experience. 
 
In the next three sections I sketch out what I take to be some of the basic claims 
needed for developing and justifying the third response. I end this section with a 
brief comment on the difference between it and the second. 
Suppose we reformulate the sceptic’s challenge as follows. For all you know, the 
property you are currently experiencing, on the basis of which you judge “this table 
is rectangular”, is merely a structural equivalent of rectangularity. This would strike 
most people as absurd, no less absurd than the suggestion that when you have a 
toothache you might be experiencing a mere structural equivalent of pain. The 
advocate of the second response to the challenge would presumably agree that this 
is absurd but insist on a distinction between the earlier knowledge version of the 
sceptic’s question and the current experiential one. How things seem in experience 
requires one explanation—an explanation that would indeed show why the struc- 
tural equivalent hypothesis in this case is absurd; knowledge of which property one 
is in fact perceiving requires a distinct explanation, where causation and other 
external factors play an independent role. In contrast, Experiential Knowledge, 
interpreted so as to silence the sceptic, closes this gap between the reaches of 
experience and explanations of knowledge, in a way that is simultaneously  
designed to address the basic reference-determination question. Experience yields 
reference-securing knowledge of the categorical property one is perceiving. 
I doubt anyone could really deny, hand on heart, that appealing to Experiential 
Knowledge in response to the sceptic is the natural move to make. We do not in fact 
think that our knowledge of which categorical property we are perceiving is beyond 
our experiential ken. Weighing in against such naturalness, though, we have cen- 
turies of philosophical theorizing in support of some version or other of the CTP. So 
the simple intuitiveness of experiential knowledge does not, on its own, constitute 
an argument in its favour. What it does do, I hope, is make an attempt at developing 
the third response a prima facie attractive undertaking, if only in order to see what 
its  limitations are. 
Of the many hurdles Experiential Knowledge must overcome, squaring it with 
Realism, is, arguably, the most pressing, certainly in the context of Newman’s 
challenge. I make some preliminary moves needed for formulating and addressing 
this issue in the last two sections. Before that, in the next section, I set out the basic 
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structure of one kind of relational theory of experience which could be appealed to 
in developing the third response to the sceptic. 
 
 
7. Experiential  Knowledge  and Acquaintance: The  Relational Response 
 
To put it first in brief summary form, relational theories of perceptual experience,  
as I will be treating them, all make the following two claims. First, perceptual 
experiences are essentially relational, where this is interpreted as entailing that that 
the object perceived is a constituent of instances of the experiential relation (rather 
than being a cause of the experience, as on the CTP). Second, the phenomenal 
properties of the experience are inherited directly from the properties of the con- 
stituent  object perceived. 
The particular version of such an account that I will sketch in this section is 
intended as an answer both to Newman’s original version of the challenge and to  
the simplified version considered in the previous section, and, for this reason, will 
be formulated in the terms used in Newman’s original version, in particular his 
Acquaintance and Sensation claims. An additional reason for formulating it in these 
terms is that the concept of “acquaintance” is being increasingly appealed to in 
discussions of perceptual experience, sometimes quite loosely, so it may  be useful  
to have as precise as possible an account of Russell’s own version of it in play when 
appealing to it to explicate Experiential Knowledge.7 
Newman’s acquaintance says that only acquaintance can secure reference to 
categorical or intrinsic properties. Sensation says that acquaintance is only possible 
with sensations. The relational response adopts something I will label the “modified 
acquaintance claim”. It says, first, that when a subject perceives objects such as tables 
and chairs the relation of acquaintance holds between the subject and these objects 
and their properties (sensation is discarded). Second, it concedes, contra Newman, 
that not only appeal to acquaintance can meet his challenge, as Lewisian and causal 
responses are also possible. It says, rather, that as a matter of fact perceptual 
experience acquaints us with external objects and their properties in such a way as to 
secure reference to categorical properties. Experiential Knowledge is true. 
 
 
7 There is a certain degree of anachronism, as far as Russell himself is concerned, in appealing to 
acquaintance in response to problems raised in The Analysis of Matter, as he had by then, officially at least, 
abandoned the doctrine of acquaintance in favour of neutral monism. This does not matter for Newman’s 
own puzzle though, which does appeal to acquaintance, and it is also worth noting that Russell himself 
appealed to it in his only known response to Newman, in which, conceding the force of Newman’s 
argument, he extended the reach of acquaintance to external causal relations. For the text of the letter and 
an interesting discussion of it, see Demopoulos and Friedman (1985). For general scepticism about how 
deep the official abandonment went see Wade Savage (1989). 
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The following two passages from Russell capture the features of acquaintance I 
want to highlight when translating them, so to speak, into claims about our per- 
ceptual awareness of mind independent objects. (I will not be concerned with his  
use of acquaintance to explain direct memory, grasp of universals and so forth.) 
First, in his popular exposition in Problems of Philosophy, after defining acquaint- 
ance as “knowledge of things”, contrasted with knowledge of truths, he writes: 
We shall say we have acquaintance with anything of which we are directly aware without the 
intermediary of any process of inference or the knowledge of truths. Thus in the presence of my table 
I am acquainted with the sense data that make up the appearance of my table—its colour, shape, 
hardness, smoothness etc. (Russell, 1912, pp. 46–47) 
This passage is useful mainly for terminological reasons. Russell’s descriptions  
of the ontological category to which sense data belong underwent various, some- 
times puzzling permutations, and drawing on his writings in explaining the rela- 
tional account of experience inevitably involves a certain amount of tidying up and 
interpretation. That said, the examples he gives of sense data here suggest a reading 
on which they should be treated as instantiated properties, instances of colour,  
shape and so forth, and that is how I will treat them.8 I also read  Newman’s 
challenge as directed at our knowledge of property (and relation) instances. I read 
his sensation claim as saying that we are only acquainted with instances of prop- 
erties ascribable to sense data, defined as Russell does here, as independent and 
distinct from physical objects such as tables. 
The main move made by  the relationalist response to Newman’s challenge, and  
to its generalized version is to say, contra Russell, that the property instances we are 
directly aware of when we see, say, a table, are not to be ascribed to sense data 
caused by the table, and distinct from it, but to the table itself. 
A final terminological point: instantiated properties are an example of what 
Russell called “simple objects”. Russell also said we are acquainted with complex 
objects, where again acquaintance is treated as knowledge of things, independent of 
knowledge of truths. An example of a complex object is a particular sense datum 
with an assortment of properties, redness and roundness, say. The relationalist 
response I will be considering extends this to external objects and says that when  
we see, say, a table, we are acquainted with the table. Put together with the claim  
that we are acquainted with properties of the object when we see them, experiential 
knowledge, as I will read it, says that when we consciously perceive an object we  
are acquainted with the object and some of its properties. 
Moving on from terminological issues, the main substantive points I want to 
extract from Russell are forcefully made in the following passage in “The Nature of 
Sense Data”. 
 
8 Here I am in agreement with Wade Savage (1989). His paper also contains an excellent discussion of 
Russell’s various takes on the nature of sense  data. 
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Presentation (or acquaintance) is a two-term relation of a subject (or better of an act) to a single 
(simple or complex) object, while judgments is a multiple relation of a subject or act to the several 
objects concerned in the judgment. From the fact that the presentation is a two-term relation, the 
question of truth or error cannot arise with regard to it: in any case of presentation there is a certain 
relation of an act to an object, the question of whether there is such an object cannot arise. (Russell, 
1913, p. 76) 
The import of the highlighted passage is that the following combination is said   
to be impossible. You have a perceptual experience correctly described as a per- 
ceptual experience of the categorical or intrinsic property of rectangularity, say; and 
there is no such instantiated property. If we hold that such properties are borne by 
external objects, this requires the existence of the external object that bears it. 
If we appeal to acquaintance thus explained to explicate Experiential Knowl- 
edge, and say Experiential Knowledge is true, the implications for both versions of 
the challenge, the generalized form and Newman’s own  are these. Contra Russell  
in The Analysis of Matter, we do not have only structural knowledge of the external 
world, and contra Newman himself (at least as he presents himself for the purposes 
of the challenge) acquaintance secures reference to non-structural intrinsic prop- 
erties  of  external objects. 
This kind of appeal to acquaintance can provide only a very crude initial state- 
ment of the basic idea of a relational theory,  and it requires various modifications   
if it is to work as a theory that does justice to important features of the phenom- 
enology of experience.9 With the space to hand, though, I want to turn now to the 
general problem of the compatibility of such a relational theory of experience with 
Realism. In the next two sections I set out what I take to be a few key issues that 
shape the debate here, and indicate lines of argument a defender of Experiential 
Knowledge should pursue and make good. 
 
 
8. Experiential  Knowledge  and Realism 
 
Many of the central problems that need considering under this heading are played 
out in the debate between Strawson and Ayer, as presented by Strawson in his 
“Perceptions and Its Objects”, about the status and nature of commonsense realism.  
I briefly set out the general problem the paper is concerned with and then isolate  
two particular problems I want to focus on. 
 
 
9 For example, an immediate and obvious objection is that surely we can and do make sense of claims 
to the effect that things that are rectangular look square. At the very least, it is plausible that the relational 
theory will need modification to allow for such cases, for example by thinking of perception as a three-
place relation between subject, object and point of view (see for example, Campbell, 2009; Brewer, 
2011). 
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Strawson’s paper is an extended critique of Ayer’s sophisticated version of the 
CTP, on which a) perceptions deliver sensations, mental items with no objective 
import; and b) our commonsense view of the world is the upshot of a (false) theory 
we  form about what we  take to be the causes of these sensations (Ayer,  1973,      
pp. 68–111). 
Strawson and Ayer agree, roughly, about what our commonsense view of the 
world consists in. On this view, the world around us “contains objects, variously 
propertied, located in a common space and continuing in their existence indepen- 
dently of our interrupted and relatively primitive perceptions of them”. They also 
agree that this commonsense view of the world is a realist one, hence their title 
“commonsense realism” for this view. Finally, it is part and parcel of this shared 
understanding of the commonsense view that the various located objects that 
populate our world are “phenomenally-propertied”; they have “colours, visual 
shapes and felt textures” (Strawson, 1979, p. 54). Or, as Ayer puts it, the objects we 
think of as inhabiting the mind independent world we perceive are conceived of 
“visuo-tactile  continuants”. 
One of the points of disagreement turns on the truth, indeed coherence of this 
particular conception of objects as “phenomenally propertied”. A second turns on 
the status of appeals to causation in explaining our perception of objects. I consider 
these in turn in this section and the next. 
Ayer holds that in thinking of objects as “visuo-tactile continuants” we project 
phenomenal properties of sensations onto the objects we perceive. An accurate 
account of both experience as it really is and the world out there as it really is will 
drop such a projection and ascribe these properties to sensations. The world we 
actually perceive, the mind independent world, has no such phenomenal properties, 
and everything essential to our everyday conception of the world is retained once 
we  eliminate this mistaken  projection. 
If Ayer is right, Experiential Knowledge, as explained by appeal to acquain- 
tance, is false. The latter requires that mind independent objects have  the kind        
of phenomenology-determining properties that Ayer says they do not have. Con- 
versely, if Experiential Knowledge is to be consistent with Realism, something like 
the basic commitments of our commonsense realism, as described by both philoso- 
phers, must be both coherent and true. In particular, it must make sense and be right 
to say that mind independent objects have properties that directly determine how 
things seem to us in experience. 
Strawson’s own defence of commonsense realism is subtle and complex, and in 
what follows I focus almost exclusively on one particular move he makes, which is 
intended to show that our conception of the objects of perception as mind inde- 
pendent is inextricably bound up with our taking them to be “phenomenally prop- 
ertied”, possessing properties such as “colours as seen” and “shapes as felt”. On 
Ayer’s view, as he presents it, our everyday notion of physical, mind independent 
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objects, the kind of entities we think of as cabbages and chairs, is fully explicable  
by appeal to the so called “primary quality” properties such as “shape” and 
“mass”—properties from which reference to all phenomenal aspects have been 
stripped away.  This is Strawson’s  response: 
 
Surely we mean by cabbage a kind of thing of which most of the specimens we have encountered 
have a characteristic range of colours and visual shapes and felt textures . . . The common conscious- 
ness is not to be fobbed off with the concession that, after all, the physical things have—in a way—a 
shape. The way in which scientific realism concedes shape is altogether the wrong way for common 
consciousness. . . . The lover of architecture who admires the lines of a building takes himself to be 
admiring features of those very objects themselves; but it is the visual shape, the visually defined 
shape that he admires. (Strawson, 1979, p. 54, my  emphasis) 
 
Now this is exactly the kind of claim about perceived properties that a defender  
of Experiential Knowledge will find congenial. For it is precisely these kinds of 
properties that one might appeal to in claiming that properties of objects directly 
determine the contours of our phenomenology when we have perceptual experi- 
ences. The looming problem though is that such properties threaten to come apart 
from the properties science refers to in a way that might suggest a two-world 
view—the phenomenal or manifest world, on the one hand, and the world as 
described by science, on the other. And I suspect that in some form or other this 
underpins many intuitions to the effect that Experiential Knowledge as explained  
by appeal to acquaintance is incompatible with Realism. 
This coming apart of worlds is certainly not something Strawson wants to 
promote, and at the end of the paper he suggests various strategies for avoiding this 
conclusion. I will not examine these here, as they contain ambiguities which it 
would take some work to unravel. Instead, I make a gesture at what seem to me to 
be the first kinds of move needed to quash two-world interpretations of the claim 
that objects are phenomenally propertied in the sense required by Experiential 
Knowledge. 
A justification of commonsense realism as a genuine form of realism will focus 
on an explanation of what is required for a subject to have an understanding of the 
idea that the objects she perceives are independent of her perception of them. Part  
of such an explanation will focus on her understanding of the perception- 
independence of the properties she ascribes to the objects she perceives. The first 
point to make in response to the two-world charge is that our first question when 
asking about the consistency of Experiential Knowledge with Realism should be 
directed at its consistency with our grasp of the perception independence of the 
properties we perceive. Questions about the relation of these to the properties 
referred to in the various sciences should only come in as a second step, relative to 
the way we have explained the properties we need to refer to in making sense of 
their  perception independence. 
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Consider now a claim often made that it is integral to making sense of the 
perception independence of the objects one perceives that one be able to make  
sense of the idea that a shape one sees on a particular occasion is identical with     
the shape one feels on that occasion. How  should we  describe what is involved      
in making sense of such an identity? Here is one account that a defender of 
Experiential Knowledge might appeal to. The subject’s visual experience is deter- 
mined by a shape as seen. Her tactile experience is determined by a shape as felt. 
Shapes as seen and as felt each have both core and periphery features. The phe- 
nomenology in each modality is determined by a combination of both. In making 
sense of their identity in thought we home in on the core (essential) features, 
abstracting away from inessential accretions to the property, accretions  made  
salient by  the different sensory modalities, the link with colours, say,  in the case   
of vision.10 
Turning to science, in the same vein, we may say that in deploying shape 
concepts in science, all interest in periphery features, the ones that interest us when 
describing conscious experience of the world, has been shed. But nothing here need 
prevent us from saying that the shapes referred to by science are identical to shapes 
referred to when we describe experiences as responses to shapes as seen and as felt. 
An immediate objection might be that the kind of treatment sketched cannot be 
applied to so called secondary qualities, such as colours, and so long as shapes as 
seen, for example, are inextricably bound up with colours we have not really 
addressed the problem of how such phenomenal properties could be truly mind 
independent. 
It is true that colours do require a slightly different treatment, but not one, as far 
as I can see, that would necessarily threaten the identity claim. What would threaten 
it is something referred to as the “revelation” claim, on which to experience a 
colour, for example, just is to grasp truths about its essence.11 Indeed in some hands, 
it is such immediate knowledge of truths about essence that is (mistakenly) equated 
with Russellian acquaintance. But so long as you insist on respecting Russell’s 
distinction between knowledge of truths and knowledge of things, you can say, with 
Campbell for example, that in experiencing objects and their properties, including 
colours, these properties are transparent to us, i.e., immediately present to us in a 
way that leaves it open that the properties we are talking about are exactly those that 
science goes on to talk about, and explain further.12 
 
10 An alternative line to take, which is not open to an acquaintance theorist, is to say that the differences 
between shape as seen and as felt are differences in mode of presentation that determine the phenomenol- 
ogy of perceptions in each modality. My own view is that there are inherent difficulties in this line. But for 
our immediate purposes it suffices to say that a defender of the phenomenal property line can pursue the 
kind of approach just sketched. 
11 For a comprehensive critical survey of various ways of appealing to revelation see Stoljar (2009). 
12 For a development of this kind of approach see Campbell (2009). 
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This is clearly a very rough first gesture at the kinds of move a defender of a 
combination of Experiential Knowledge and Realism might make. The  central 
point is that, as far as I can see, the issue raised by ascribing phenomenal properties 
to objects in the way required for such a consistency is not, or need not be, a deep 
metaphysical one, but, rather, one that requires careful technical formulations of 
conditions  on  property identity. 
 
 
9. The  CTP Again 
 
I end with a brief comment on the second point of contention between Strawson and 
Ayer, which brings us back full circle to the very idea of the CTP. According to 
Ayer, the CTP is not part of our everyday concept of perception, but a theoretical 
addition. Strawson disagrees. He writes: 
We think of perception as a way, indeed the basic way, of informing ourselves about the world of 
independently existing things: we assume, that is to say, the general reliability of our perceptual 
experiences; and that assumption is the same as the assumption of a general causal dependence of 
our perceptual experiences on the independently existing things we take them to be of. . . . It really 
should be obvious that with the distinction between independently existing objects and perceptual 
awareness of objects we already have the general notion of causal dependence of the latter on the 
former, even if this is not a matter to which we give much reflective attention in our pre-theoretical 
days. (Strawson, 1979, p. 51) 
This reads like a straightforward endorsement of the CTP in the name of realism. 
And there is little doubt that it captures an important motivation for many for 
endorsing the CTP. This is an issue that any relational theory needs to address, and 
indeed there have been several suggestions in recent writings about how this might 
be done.13 For our immediate purposes it is sufficient to draw on some of these 
responses to make a very general point. 
As Strawson notes, there does seem to be a link between thinking of objects out 
there as independent of our perception of them, and thinking of our perceptions as  
in some way causally dependent on the way the world is. It is a further question, 
though, how this understanding of causal dependence should be explained. The  
CTP is one way of doing so, but it is debateable whether it captures the particular 
role played by the idea of causal dependence in our very grasp of the idea of a mind 
independent world. An alternative will appeal to the role played by causal under- 
standing in our grasp of a primitive theory of perception on which we explain our 
perceptions to ourselves as the joint causal outcome of the state of the world and  
our own  position in it. 
 
13 For a survey of recent examples of such strategies see Roessler (2011a, pp. 7–11); and papers in 
Roessler et  al. (2011) by Child (2011), Steward (2011), Roessler (2011b) and Snowdon (2011). 
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Reasoning in the way required by grasp of the theory involves grasp of the 
causally  enabling  conditions  of  perception,  grasp  of  the  idea  that  in  order     
to see something, for example, there must be nothing in the way, one must be 
correctly located and so forth.  An  understanding  of  these  conditions  grounds  
our realism about these objects by  making intelligible the idea that its seeming to  
us that things are a certain way is not sufficient for them being such, these further 
causal conditions must be met. But it is possible to insist on the importance of      
this kind of causal understanding for commonsense realism  while  simulta-  
neously insisting that the explanandum, the experience, is relationally individu- 
ated.  There  is  no  immediate  route  from  the  importance  of   this   kind   of 
causal explanation to the claim that experience and object must be “separate 
existences”. 
To put the point another way: as far as doing justice  to  the  link  between  
realism and causal understanding is concerned, appeal to grasp of enabling con- 
ditions suffices. Contra Strawson, both the CTP and the relational theory should, 
arguably, be considered as further, philosophical theories about the way in which 
experiences should be individuated. The general background theoretical question, 
made vivid by Newman’s original challenge is, precisely: what are the theoretical 
constraints on such an individuation? The specific question is: should epistemo- 
logical concerns provide a constraint, and if they should, are such constraints 
compatible  with  realism?  I  have  been  sketching  first  moves  in  the  direction  
of defending a positive answer  to both questions, an answer  that tells strongly        
in favour of a  relational  treatment  of  experiences  and  against  the  CTP.  If  the 
line of  argument  I  have  been  pursuing  is  along  the  right  lines,  this  is  the  
kind of approach Strawson himself should favour, given his insistence that 
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